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WHAT WE BELIEVE THEY DESERVE: GUANTANAMO,
9/11, HAITIANS, MARIEL CUBANS, AND "NATIONAL
SECURITY" AS A PRETEXT FOR UNCHECKED POWER
Mark Dow'
I. INTRODUCTION
We are in an era of particular shamelessness and duplicity with
respect to American power in general, and overreaching executive
authority in particular. I want to examine some of the disinformation and
hypocrisy constituting this shamelessness by looking backward and
forward, making a few connections between post-September 11th policies
and related attempts by the U.S. executive to justify mistreatment of
disfavored groups by applying the "right" labels to them.
Soon after September 11, 2001, the President invoked the word "evil"1
for a good and strategic reason: if we are fighting Evil, then by definition,
whatever we do under the banner of fighting it is Good. I called the White
House press office to ask what George W. Bush meant by the word "evil."
My calls were not returned. But in the early arguments over military
tribunals and prisoner-of-war status, Dick Cheney provided the following
answer: the tribunal, he said, "guarantees that we'll have the kind of
t Mark Dow is the author of AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS and
co-editor with David R. Dow of MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S
DEATH PENALTY REGIME. This is an edited transcript of remarks made as part of the
2004 University of Tulsa College of Law Symposium: International Law and the 2003-
04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers Between National,
Foreign, and International Law? Mark Dow can be reached at mdow@igc.org.
1. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/200 2/01/20020129-11.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2004).
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treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve."' That's the
"we" and the logic of the lynch mob, and it is a pithy summary of the
administration's various policies aimed at loosening any legal or moral
restraints that might keep us from administering the deserved treatment,
whether inside our borders, at our Cuban enclave, or in the estimated
thirty-nine prisons around the world, in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere,
where "we" are hiding detainees
II. OUR LAWLESS ENCLAVE
For all the criticism the current administration deserves, it is
important to remember that federal law enforcement abuses did not
appear out of thin air on September 12, 2001. And neither did
Guantdnamo. What we call "Guantdnamo" is actually the U.S. Naval Base
occupying some 45 square miles (118 square kilometers) of the
Guantdnamo province in eastern Cuba. Here is the first point at which a
fair person, even knowing little about the intricacies of international law,
might feel that some international system is necessary to resolve disputes.
Even if the Platt Amendment and the 1903 treaty leading to U.S. presence
in Guant6namo were not themselves arguably the result of coercion; and
even if the U.S. were not arguably in breach of the treaty which granted
U.S. presence for the purposes of its own defense, Cuba's defense, and
coaling and Navy stations; still, the Cuban government has protested the
legitimacy of the U.S. base since 1961. Even Justice Scalia acknowledged
in Rasul v. Bush that the Guantfnamo acreage was "merely leased for a
particular use."4
All of this became part of the legal disputes in which, of course, the
U.S. government made the argument that precisely because it did not
exercise sovereignty over its own Naval base in Guantfnamo, it could do
whatever it wanted there. In an impressive bit of logic, the dissent in
Gherebi v. Bush - that is, the 9th Circuit judge who agreed with the
government's position - said that the U.S.'s ability to violate the lease with
impunity does not mean that the U.S. has sovereignty; it only means, wrote
Judge Graber, that the U.S. "simply is big enough and strong enough that
2. Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 14,
2001), available at
http:llwww.whitehouse.govlvicepresidentlnews-speechesspeehesvp20011114-1.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce].
3. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES' "DISAPPEARED": THE CIA'S LONG-
TERM "GHOST DETAINEES," 4 (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/usl004/usl004.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2004).
4. 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2709 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Cuba has been unable to enforce its legal entitlements."'  Presumably
someone who believes in the rule of law would want a mechanism of
international law enforcement in place here. But let me go back to 1991.
In a federal district courtroom in downtown Miami, a number of
military men int uniform filed in to fill the front rows so that Judge Clyde
Atkins would have a clear view of them. One of the attorneys later told
me that it was the kind of military tactic of intimidating a judge that one
expects in many Latin American countries. Here the message was
"national security," military necessity, and that the local judge should
know his place. The case, Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, involved
the forced repatriation of Haitians fleeing military violence and being
picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard.' A restraining order had
already been issued "barring the government from continuing the
repatriations."7 At this hearing, Judge Atkins heard arguments about the
temporary restraining order (TRO), about the court's jurisdiction, and
about the enforceability of Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol on
the Status of Refugees discouraging the forced return of potential
refugees. As I recall, the government's lawyer told the judge (in answer to
a direct question) that yes, the interdicted Haitians now in U.S. custody
had certain rights, but no, those rights were not enforceable. It seemed,
and seems, an extraordinary thing for anyone, but especially a government
lawyer, to say. The lawyer was Kenneth Starr. I am told that
Washington's decision to send the Solicitor General to argue a case in a
district court is also a way of sending a message, and Starr essentially
confirmed this when Judge Atkins extended the TRO. Starr said he was
not at liberty to agree with the extension and added, "at the highest level
of the government there is profound concern about this litigation." 8
Now why am I making the government's attempt to win a case sound
so sinister? There are several reasons, all related to double standards and
executive lawlessness, justified with the pretext of "national security," and
all of which demonstrate the need to hold nations accountable. First, the
authority for the U.S.'s interdiction of Haitians at sea was based on an
executive agreement between the Reagan Administration and dictator
Franqois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier. Second, the U.S. had supported the
Duvalier dictatorship. Third, the U.S. supported and funded the
5. 352 F.3d 1278, 1310 (9th Cir. 2003).
6. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
7. Eleventh Circuit Twice Overturns Bar on Repatriation of Hatians 68 No. 48
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1845 (1991).
8. Author's notes of hearing (regarding Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1552),
December 2, 1991 (on file with author).
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paramilitary group FRAPH responsible for the murder and repression that
forced Haitians to flee their country after the 1991 coup against President
Jean Bertrand Aristide9 - these were the Haitians whose forced
repatriation led to the scene in the Miami courtroom. Fourth, the
detention of Haitian asylum-seekers as a means of deterring other
potential refugees from fleeing persecution violates international standards
of refugee protection, according to the late Arthur Helton, a refugee policy
expert, and others. (Helton was killed in the August 2003 bombing of the
UN headquarters in Baghdad.) Fifth, the U.S. government's longstanding
claim, in the absence of individualized determinations, that "[t]he majority
of Haitian boat people, and the majority of asylum applicants.... [are]
intending economic migrants"' is considered a violation of international
law. As early as 1980, the U.S. government was asserting that repatriated
Haitians were not persecuted on their return, though White House official
Frank White later admitted that "no one inside or outside the government
really believed it.""
After forced repatriations from Guantdinamo, U.S. officials made false
claims about U.S. monitoring of returned asylum-seekers. 2 Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker and subsequent litigation concerned the
fairness of asylum screening procedures at Guantdnamo and on board U.S.
Coast Guard cutters. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) refused to participate in the "cursory screenings,"
saying that the procedures "deviate significantly from international and
U.S. law."13 But there was little or no recourse from what attorney John
Gibbons, in the oral arguments on Rasul v. Bush, would call a "lawless
enclave.' '14 In case there was recourse, the U.S. changed its policy in 1992
"from using Guantdnamo as a site for conducting refugee screenings... to
the policy of automatic interdiction and return of all Haitians interdicted
on the high seas."15 UNHCR called the Supreme Court ruling in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, upholding the legality of interdiction and
9. Mark Dow, Occupying and Obscuring Haiti, 5.2 NEW POLITICS (1995), at
http://www.wpunj.edu/-newpolissuel8/dowl8.htm#r18 (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
10. THE HAITI FILES: DECODING THE CRISIS 188 (James Ridgeway ed., 1994).
11. DAVID W. ENGSTROM, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING ADRIFT: THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION AND THE MARIEL BOATLIFT 174 n.47 (1997).
12. Mark Dow, A Refugee Policy to Support Haiti's Killers, 5.1 NEW POLITICS (1994), at
http://www.wpunj.edul-newpollissuel7/dowl7.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
13. Bill Frelick, Safe Haven: Safe for Whom? U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES available at
http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/safehavens-wrs95.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
14. Oral Argument of John J. Gibbons on Behalf of Petitioners at 3, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686 (2004).
15. Frelick, supra note 13, at 8.
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repatriation, "a setback to modern international refugee law." 16 Most of
the Haitians would indeed be repatriated, many of them handed over
directly to the Haitian military on disembarking at Port-au-Prince, some
forced by high-powered water hoses from the U.S. cutters. (Chinese have
also been interdicted at sea by the U.S., held at Guantdnamo, and "quietly
and summarily returned."17 So have would-be immigrants from several
other countries. Cubans have also been detained in large numbers at
Guantinamo though most have been allowed into the U.S.)
The mistreatment of Haitians in the "lawless enclave" 8 demands its
own a full-scale history. Here I will just mention that they were
unnecessarily confined behind razor wire; their peaceful protests were met
by assaults from military police riot squads; they were subjected to the
"psy-ops" (psychological operations) technique of blaring music - a
technique also used against Manuel Noriega in the Vatican embassy,
David Koresh and his followers, and "enemy combatants" at Guantinamo
more recently. Unaccompanied Haitian refugee children reported being
"cracked" at Guantdnamo - "their hands cuffed behind their back, their
feet cuffed and then stepped on .... The cuffings often occur[ed] in
conjunction with other punishments, such as ... being forced to kneel for
hours on hot cement or beds of ants." 9 More than 200 Haitians, despite
having passed the stringent "screening procedures," which should have
allowed them into the U.S. to pursue asylum claims, were further detained
because they tested positive for HIV. District Court Judge Sterling
Johnson, who would rule in 1993 to allow the HIV positive Haitians in,
wrote that the 200 or so sick refugees were "subjected to pre-dawn military
sweeps as they sleep by as many as 400 soldiers dressed in full riot gear."20
In his dissent in Rasul, Justice Scalia would write, as if the Naval Base itself
were the victim, that the majority was "subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the
oversight of the federal courts."" At least one HIV positive refugee said
she and other women were forcibly injected at Guant~namo with the
contraceptive Depo-Provera.22 All this must remain beyond the oversight
of any court, the executive argues, because of "national security" and
because the judiciary has traditionally shown great deference in matters of
16. Id.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Oral Argument of John J. Gibbons on Behalf of Petitioners, supra note 14.
19. Haitian Children Imprisoned at Guantanamo: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, HAITI
PROGRPS, May 2, 1995, at 9.
20. PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF HAITI 277 (1994).
21. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706.
22. FARMER, supra note 20, at 280.
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immigration policy (the pretext that intimidation of and violence against
asylum seekers are a form of securing our borders). The bottom line is the
Haitians were getting "the kind of treatment... that we believe they
deserve."23
These pretexts become clearer when we note a few continuities from
the 1990s into the so-called war on terror. The Justice Department refused
to release the names of some 200 unaccompanied Haitian children on
Guantdnamo to the Haitian community in the U.S. because it claimed it
was protecting their safety, although around the same time it released the
names of unaccompanied Cuban children on Guantdnamo to Miami's
Cuban community.14 After the post-September 11th domestic round-ups,
the Justice Department refused to release the names of detainees because,
it absurdly claimed, it was protecting the detainees' privacy and safety.
When the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey attempted to
force the release of the names based on a New Jersey statute saying such
• • ,,21
records of inmate names "shall be open to public inspection, the federal
government argued that these were "detainees" and not "inmates" - the
word game again. It further argued that because these were federal
detainees held in state jails under contract with the federal government,
that a federal policy prohibiting the release of names must supercede the
local statute. Two months after making the argument in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, the federal government argued outside of any court
that a United Nation's plan to monitor prisons worldwide "would be
unconstitutional in the United States because it does not recognize states'
rights."26  According to news reports, the U.S. opposed the prison
monitoring plan "because of potential demands for access" 27 to the post-
September 11 Guant~namo prisoners - for reasons that are now clear.
III. ASYLUM SEEKERS, TERRORISTS, ETC.
Since September 11, 2001, the "terror" pretext has intersected with
anti-Haitian immigration policies. In October 2002, a boat carrying 216
23. Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 2.
24. Mark Dow, Keeping the Haitians Out: A Conversation with Cheryl Little 14 (Tap Tap
Haitian Restaurant 1995) (on file with author).
25. Press Release, New Jersey ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Files Lawsuit Seeking
Information
on Post-September 11 Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) available at
http://archive.aclu.org/news/2002/nO12202c.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2004).
26. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Fails in Effort to Block Vote on U.N. Convention on Torture,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002 at A7.
27. Id.
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people from Haiti and the Dominican Republic sailed into Biscayne Bay
off Miami. Most of the passengers were taken into custody. In November,
an immigration judge found that one of these Haitians, an 18-year-old,
could be released on bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the
bond decision. Attorney General John Ashcroft intervened, however, so
that neither "D-J-" nor the other Haitians could be released even on the
basis of individualized case determinations, citing "national security"2
interests together with "sound immigration policy."29  The Attorney
General ordered the young Haitian man and others "similarly situated" to
remain in detention pending their asylum proceedings, whatever an
immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Affairs might rule.
Ashcroft cited a statement from a Defense Department official invoking
the "war on terrorism," and claiming that the release of the Haitian asylum
applicant could "trigger mass migration events"3° from Haiti, which would
also create a possibility of terrorist infiltration."
Ashcroft uses the magic words "national security interest" and, even
more immune to argument, "the terrorist attacks of September 11," then
informs us that the State Department "has 'noticed an increase in third
country nations (Pakistani, Palestinians, etc.) using Haiti as a staging point
for attempted migration to the United States."'32 That "etc." seems like a
tip-off, but we even have an anonymous State Department official - like a
twenty-five-year delayed echo of that Carter State Department official -
saying "[w]e all are scratching our heads" " about the source of the
Attorney General's assertion. In any case, there was no claim, as far as I
know, that the eighteen-year-old Haitian was himself in reality Pakistani,
Palestinian, or "etc., 34 In his edict, the Attorney General assures us he is
not violating international law. We might take it as a positive sign that he
felt the need to make this claim, but surely in a just world he would not be
the one to determine that.
Since In re D-J-, Margaret H. Taylor observes, it seems that the
Department of Homeland Security has been expanding its use of the
"remarkably broad" rationale for detention-without-bond to other groups
28. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, Int. Dec. 3488 (A.G. 2003).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 578.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 579.
33. Ashcroft Leaking Logic, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 29, 2003 at A16.
34. D-J- was deported to Haiti on November 29, 2004. Alva James-Johnson, U.S. deports
Haitian youth held for more than 2 years, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/nation/lO307675.htm?lc (last visited Dec.
18, 2004).
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- for example, to "all noncitizens who have been convicted of a sex
offense, regardless of the seriousness of the underlying offense, the
detainee's risk of flight, or danger to the community."35 In Arizona, Taylor
reports, Brazilians are being detained without bond because DHS has
decreed them "a heightened risk of flight because of smuggling activity,"36
and "[e]choing the rationale" of the latest anti-Haitian policy, DHS has
justified the Brazilian detentions by claiming that the use of resources for
apprehending the Brazilians on the Southwest border "poses a threat to
national security."37
While there are continuities in current U.S. anti-Haitian policies going
back twenty-five years, there is also a new shamelessness on the face of
these policies in terms of both the participation of the U.S. in forcing
Aristide from office and supporting anti-democratic forces, and in the
related anti-Haitian immigration policies. In early 2004, groups that were
apparently "armed by, trained by, and employed by the intelligence
services of the United States"38 pulled off a second coup against Aristide.
One of Aristide's former bodyguards told of U.S. troops running things in
the unmarked plane that removed Aristide from Haiti: "They sat us down
and didn't tell us where we were going."39 Cheney said Aristide had "worn
out his welcome," and that "[w]e helped facilitate his departure when he
indicated he was ready to go."4°According to attorney Ira Kurzban, who
had argued the 1991 case in that Miami courtroom, the U.S. had made
1 41
"contingency plans for Guantanamo" weeks before the operation. On
the same day that Kurzban described the links between the U.S. and
Haitian paramilitary forces, George W. Bush told the Haitian people,
"[w]e will turn back any refugee that attempts to reach our shore. 42 The
U.S. Committee for Refugees noted that Bush "has finally spoken the
35. Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration
Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. REv. 149, 168 (2004).
36. Id.
37. Id. at n.99.
38. Amy Goodman & Jeremy Scahill, Haiti's Lawyer: US Is Arming Anti-Aristide
Paramilitaries in GETTING HAITI RIGHT THIS TIME: THE U.S. AND THE Coup 47 (2004).
39. Aristide's Bodyguard Describes the US Role In His Ouster in GETTING HAITI RIGHT
THIS TIME: THE U.S. AND THE CoUP 151,152 (2004).
40. Eric Green, Cheney Says Aristide Made Own Choice to Resign as Haiti's President, at
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040304-26.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
41. Goodman & Scahill, supra note 38, at 47.
42. Press Release, U.S. Committee for Refugees, President Bush Finally Speaks the Truth
about America's Unlawful Treatment of Haitian Refugees, Feb. 26, 2004, at
http://www.regugees.org/news/pressjreleases/2004/022604.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
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truth about American practice toward Haitian refugees,, 43 that he had
"flagrantly rejected the legal and ethical obligation" of refugee protection
which "no [other] state claims the right to violate."45  Three of 2000
interdicted Haitians were found to have a credible fear of persecution in
46
the summer of 2004. Despite widespread political violence, hurricane
damage, and a humanitarian crisis caused by flooding, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) continued and continues to deport Haitians,
while Nicaraguans and Hondurans in the U.S. have been granted
extensions of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) here after recent
hurricane damage in their home countries.
Anti-Haitian policies and the "war on terror," different as they are,
have at least three things in common: 1) if you categorize a person in a
certain way, her rights and protections are gone; 2) if you categorize the
place where you hold that person in a certain way, her rights and
protections are gone; and, 3) using the pretext of war or national security,
you can do anything at all to a person - certainly to a non-citizen.
Consider a few permutations of the government's exploitation of war
and national security, and more specifically of "danger" and
"dangerousness": 48 with regard to Haitian asylum-seekers, successive
administrations have lied about the danger Haitians were fleeing, even
while supporting or financing that very danger. (In the 1980's we saw a
similar pattern with Salvadorans and Guatemalans.) With regard to Yaser
Hamdi of Louisiana, there is not much to say now: the government would
have us believe he was dangerous enough to be confined at Guantdnamo
for three years, quite possibly tortured there, but that now it is safe to
release him on his word that he will not participate in terrorism. And of
course, to be really safe, the government claims that Hamdi renounced his
U.S. citizenship. I presume this is to give the U.S. more leeway in
mistreating him should the need arise. Note that I say the government
"claims" Hamdi agreed to renounce his citizenship; that is because one







47. U.S. Policy Grants TPS to Many - Except Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 2004, at
26.
48. See Taylor, supra note 35.
49. David R. Dow, Letters, Yaser Hamdi, U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A24.
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With respect to Abu Ghraib and dangerousness, CBS News twice
postponed its broadcast of the now infamous photos at the Pentagon's
request, finally airing them because the competition was about to do so."
The reason given for the delay was the potential danger to American
soldiers and other hostages in Iraq - legitimate concerns. Earlier, it had
been necessary to bar the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) from Abu Ghraib in order to protect the dangers being imposed
on the Iraqi prisoners by the Americans.
In the oral arguments in Rasul, Solicitor General Theodore Olson's
opening statement began: "The United States is at war."'" Justice John
Paul Stevens soon interrupted with a question: "Mr. Olson, supposing the
war had ended, could you continue to detain these people on Guantanmo?
Would there then be jurisdiction? ... So the existence of the war is really
irrelevant to the legal issue?"52 Olson essentially conceded the point, but
couldn't let it go: "It is not irrelevant, because it is in this context that that
question is raised... It doesn't depend upon that" (that is, his argument
doesn't depend on the war), "but it's even more forceful. And more
compelling. 5 3 Let's not forget that this is the undeclared war without end.
What strikes me in these various cases is the executive's claims for
limitlessness in every sense: in place, in time, and in action. "What
matters," writes Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Rasul, "is the
unchallenged and indefinite control that the United States has long
exercised over Guantdnamo Bay. 54 There we have limitlessness in place
and time.
Here is limitlessness in time and action: in the arguments in Rumsfeld
v. Padilla about the executive's authority to detain a U.S. citizen
indefinitely, Justice Ginsburg asked Deputy Solicitor General Paul
Clement: "[I]f the law is what the executive says it is, whatever is necessary
and appropriate in the executive's judgment"55 (here she was alluding to
the post 9/11 congressional authorization for the president to use necessary
and appropriate force) "what is it that would be a check against torture?"56
Ginsburg tried two or three times to get an answer. Clement was evasive,
50. Stephen J. Berry, CBS Lets the Pentagon Taint Its News Process, 58.3 NIEMAN REP. 76,
77-78.
51. Oral Argument of Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson on Behalf of Respondents at
21, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 3686 (2004) (No. 03-334).
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id.
54. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Oral Argument of Paul D. Clement on Behalf of Petitioner at 18, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (Nos. 03-1027).
56. Id.
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but he did answer that there is no check on torture if the president or his
people want to use it; "the fact that executive discretion in a war situation
can be abused is not a good and sufficient reason for judicial
micromanagement and overseeing of that authority."57 Clement said that
"the military ought to have the option of proceeding with" its captives in
such a way that it can "get actionable intelligence to prevent future
terrorist attacks. 58 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Clement again referred to the
necessity of "interrogation without access to counsel"59 when the citizen
being interrogated might be of "paramount intelligence value."' This time
Justice Stevens asked whether anything in the law limits interrogation
methods. Clement reassuringly told the court "that the last thing you want
to do is torture somebody or try to do something along those lines,"61 since
that would affect the "reliability" of information obtained. The photos
from Abu Ghraib were broadcast that evening.
IV. MAINLAND GUANTANAMO
The Supreme Court heard arguments related to torture and summary
execution in the October 2004 term as well (Clark v. Martinez and Benitez
v. Rozos). But this case is not about alleged terrorists or "enemy
combatants"-which is part of the reason it has received so little attention,
even among those with civil liberties high on their agendas. The victims
here are Mariel Cubans" and other so-called "inadmissible aliens." Once
again the premise is that if we categorize certain people in a certain way,
then they cease to be persons at all - at least as far as due process and
humanity are concerned. In a sort of mainland Guantanamo, the
government says it can do anything at all to certain people who are here
because (in a bizarre legalistic sense) they are not people and they are not
here.
Allowed by Fidel Castro to depart the island in 1980 from the port of
Mariel, some 125,000 Cubans came to the United States over a six-month
period. Many of them have committed crimes here, and detention
typically begins on completion of a criminal sentence for anything from
murder to shoplifting, though one Mariel Cuban was locked up for not
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Oral Argument By Paul D. Clement on Behalf of Respondents at 24, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
60. Id. at 23.
61. Id. at 41.
62. See MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS ch. 14
(2004).
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being able to afford medical care. Cuba will not take them back, and the
U.S. says it can detain them for any length of time. In 2001, at least 160
Mariel Cubans had been detained by the Immigration and Naturalization
61Service (INS) for a decade or more after completing criminal sentences.
In 2004, thirty-three Cubans were reported to have been detained so far --
again, after completing criminal sentences for fifteen years or more.64
Many do get released, but the immigration service can detain them again,
as one court put it, for "almost any reason.,
65
The Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration &
Customs Enforcement is authorized to detain noncitizens so that it can
deport them. In 2001 the Supreme Court ruled in Zadvydas v. Davis that
when a detainee's deportation cannot be carried out within a "reasonably
foreseeable" period, defined by the court as six months in most cases, she
must be released. Obviously the Zadvydas ruling applies to immigrants
who are present in the United States. But the government argues that it
does not apply to the Mariel Cubans, who have been here since President
Jimmy Carter welcomed them twenty-five years ago. That is because the
Mariel Cubans were "paroled" into the U.S. by the executive and are thus
legally considered not to have "entered." Exploiting this so-called "entry
fiction" - never intended to apply to circumstances like those of the Mariel
refugees - the U.S. government argues that the 917 Mariels currently in
detention, as of October 2004, have no right to be free from detention
here, ever.
Yet in the government's duplicitous logic, because the prisoners
receive annual custody reviews by low-level bureaucrats, their detention is
not "indefinite" at all; "the passage of time is relevant to [their] claim,"
according to the government. 66 Never mind that those "annual reviews" are
often not given annually, that the decisions are notoriously arbitrary, that
there is no appeals process, that the prisoners are not entitled to lawyers,
or that when they do get representation the legal representatives are
regularly barred from the reviews in violation of the government's own
guidelines. In the words of a classic Supreme Court decision: "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned.,
67
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Here are a few examples of the victims of this policy. Soon after his
arrival on the boatlift, one man was given probation for attempted
robbery. Then he served two years for misdemeanor marijuana
possession, a parole violation. Then the U.S. immigration agency kept him
imprisoned for twenty years.
Another Mariel Cuban was sentenced to ninety days for misdemeanor
cocaine possession after a series of earlier misdemeanors. Then the INS
held him for fifteen years. Then one day, apparently, he was no longer
dangerous, and he was released.
A Mariel Cuban man who served five years for attempted murder was
imprisoned after his sentence for another fifteen years by the INS. After
one custody review, immigration officials denied him release on the basis
that he showed insufficient remorse for his crime. After a subsequent
review, they denied him release on the basis that his expression of remorse
was merely a "tactic" to get released.
The logic is not only arbitrary, it mirrors that of the meaningless crime
of pelegrosidad, or dangerousness, in Cuba, for which many of the Mariel
Cubans were imprisoned by Castro, and for which many fled in 1980.
Others left Cuba after local police threatened them with prison for
pelegrosidad if they did not leave. I have been talking about Mariel
Cubans who are taken into custody after committing crimes here; a study
remains to be written on the truth about the number of prisoners or
criminals released from Cuban jails to join the Mariel exodus. Even the
INS commissioner (admittedly on the defensive against media hysteria in
the 1980s about Mariel crime) told the press that 21,000 of the oft-cited
23,000 so-called criminals in the Mariel boatlift "were involved in very
minor misdemeanors or, in many cases, political kinds of crimes that would
not be crimes in the U.S." Still, in law-enforcement circles here the term
"Marielito" became synonymous with "criminal." Speaking about crimes
allegedly committed here, the INS commissioner said that the numbers of
Mariel criminals was greatly exaggerated:
There's an unfortunate tendency now in some quarters for every
Hispanic arrested to be labeled a Marielito. For example, there were
some 800 names that New York officials gave us of suspected Marielitos
who were involved in criminal activity. It turned out that only 80 of
them were actually Cuban and only 19 were Marielitos.69
On top of that, some criminals were actually welcomed because of
their crimes: in 1980, the Cuban government "noted that the United States
68. U.S. Won't "Let Another Mariel Happen," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 16,
1984, at 30.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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had welcomed as heros [sic] those Cubans who had forcibly hijacked
boats.
,70
Even today the Scarface-assisted version of reality persists.71 That
film's opening informs us that Castro sent "the dregs of his jails," repeating
the figure of 25,000 prisoners that apparently includes Castro's political
prisoners.72 In a twentieth anniversary DVD of the movie, released last
year to widespread uncritical acclaim, Oliver Stone self-importantly
informs viewers that he performed actual law-enforcement research in
three Florida cities. When the movie was in danger of receiving an X
rating, which would have meant less profit, producer Martin Bregman
"appealed to the ratings board, bringing along some law enforcement
, ,71
officers.., who said that the movie carried an antidrug message. In the
recent Supreme Court arguments, Oliver Stone spoke again, this time
through Antonin Scalia: "they just open their jails and say, hey, you know,
go wherever you want. 7 4 Today the U.S.-Cuban collaboration continues
as the Mariel prisoners are held as pawns in diplomatic maneuvering and
migration talks.
After doing time on drug charges, a Mariel Cuban woman was denied
release by the INS because she had nowhere to live. Denied her anti-
depressant medication, she became suicidal, and after a subsequent
custody review was denied release because of a suicide attempt. Even the
warden of the Louisiana jail holding her for the federal government had
recommended her release.
Or can they? If Mariel Cuban prisoners are not entitled to any
more "due process" than the administration claims, wrote the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 2003, "we do not see why the United States
government could not torture or summarily execute them., 75 In the
Clark/Benitez arguments, Justice John Paul Stevens raised the same
question, wondering whether the government could just "shoot" the
Mariel Cubans. Government attorney Edwin S. Kneedler replied
"absolutely not. ' , 76 But he avoided saying clearly why the claimed authority
for endless detention could not also be used for summary execution.
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In the hallway after the argument I asked him for the reason. He
declined to answer when I declined to go "off the record," and said only
that the government doesn't argue cases in the media. So I was not quite
accurate when I said above that the government asserts it can do anything
at all to these people: in this case, lacking the terrorist cover, even the
government mouthpiece seemed unable to let himself articulate the deeper
truth of what he was arguing for.
This case is not about the "hordes of aliens" conjured by Kneedler."
Neither is it about the "the fundamental power of the United States to
protect its borders. 78 And it is certainly not about the Al Qaeda attacks
on New York and Washington - the "events of recent years," as Kneedler
delicately put it, joining the September lth attacks in a sentence with
"migration crises involving Haitians and Cubans."7 9 This case is about the
limits of executive authority against those whose humanity would be
denied for the sake of - what? For the sake of that very authority. It is the
same circular, self-justifying logic of power that Cheney articulated so well.
77. Rebuttal Argument of Edwin S. Kneedler on Behalf of the Petitioners at 55, Clark 124
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